Aquinas and Massa Damnata: A Brutish Take from a Subtle Mind

    As I haven't written or recorded anything in over a year, something I've done before, I figured I would post my brief thoughts on a section in Aquinas's writings on predestination. At this point, I may as well publicly announce that I believe that all will be saved in the end, because this critique is in light of my paradigmatic shift. Philosophically, I'm still fairly Thomistic, but I have been having issues with Aquinas' theology. This post may in fact be the first of a series of critiques of not only massa damnata, viz., the view that the majority of mankind is damned forever, but of a certain traditional Western understanding of damnation in general. Any faithful Catholic need not worry, as confidence in universal salvation is nothing close to heresy, especially since the Church teaches that we should pray and hope for it and that it is the sole intention of the Church to bring it about. Enough of the detour; let's get into the topic.  

    To begin, in Article 7 on the question of Predestination in the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas poses the question of whether the number of the predestined is certain. The hypothetical objector in Objection 3 supposes that, in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things, so if the number of the predestined are fixed, then the majority of mankind is saved given that salvation is a good. However, the biblical image of the broad and narrow gates in Matthew refutes this idea (which Aquinas actually believes and is not merely apart of his hypothetical objection, although I reject this interpretation), so the number of the predestined can't be certain. Aquinas responds as such: 

The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.

    To preface, while the objection supposes the number of the predestined is not certain, Aquinas in his main reply supposes that it is certain, so while the objector's argument for a kind of massa condonata is fallible, Aquinas's reply is in light of the certainty of the number of the predestined, thus taking this argument for massa damnata to be decisive. There are a number of errors here:

    Firstly, it is obvious that the common state of nature depends on the condition of the nature, as even Aquinas admits here that the nature in question is a deprived nature, so what is proportionate to the common state of a deprived nature is not essentially what is proportionate to the common state of a perfect nature, so a good's status as proportionate or not to the common state of nature is accidental. If sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life is an example of a good proportionate to the common state of nature, given that one's nature need give the individual the tools at least sufficient to achieve its ends as natural justice demands, then this would also involve the tool of moral conscience, as one needs conscience for the guidance of life and psychopaths are in the minority. Now, there was a time when the common conscience permitted or condoned slavery, and so the good of the will to perceive its evil was a good that exceeded the common state of nature and so was in a minority of men, but now this good is proportionate to the common state of nature since most reject slavery out of hand.

    Secondly, and most obviously, Aquinas is taking principles of nature, particularly principles of the natural distributions of goods, and subjecting grace to these principles, as if grace was bound to follow principles of the distribution of natural goods, and this is explicit formally in both his objection and his reply. Since Aquinas holds that goods of grace, like salvation, exceed the whole order of nature, it's inconsistent to suppose that God's distribution of salvific grace follows the principles of the distribution of natural goods, entailing neither a massa damnata nor a massa condonata. Similarly to the idea that God's grace and power are not confined to sacraments such that God can give sacramental grace to a man without the material sacrament (baptisms of repentance and blood for example), God's grace isn't bound to principles of natural distribution. This is something I'm surprised to see in Aquinas.

    Lastly, and most horrifically, the picture envisaged here is that of a majority of a species who is condignly consigned to never-ending suffering because it is the proportionate consequence of a diseased nature inherited through no fault of their own that they "fall short," meaning that the average person never had a chance, and that it is precisely in this mass damnation of man that God's mercy is made manifest, because instead of sending the whole of humanity to hell, He deigned to spare a few special souls which, according to Aquinas elsewhere, rejoice in being in a special club by peering down at the damned and seeing what torment they escaped, and this great partition is to be seen as gracious. This is not the image of God's grace that I have, nor should anyone have it. Grace is more gracious when it is given generously and liberally, not when it is frugally kept and sparingly parsed out. Aquinas should agree with this, given that he teaches that we are all in need of grace and that to give to those in need is an act of love and mercy and that God loves all and takes no delight in the sufferings of others and desires that all be saved. God gains nothing from us, but we gain everything from God. He gains nothing from reserving grace and loses nothing by giving it, as He is infinite, whereas we lose everything without grace and gain everything with it. He is always giving whether or not we are willing to receive. Grace abounds. Amen.

    Thank you for reading, and let me know your thoughts in the comment section below.